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* * * 
PROF. HANSEN: This is our final session of the morning, “Government Leaders’ 
Perspectives on IP.” We have a fantastic group. We are very fortunate to have them here. 
I appreciate their taking time out from their busy lives and important jobs to be here. 
Our first speaker is Andrei Iancu, who is head of the Patent and Trademark Office 
and Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property. 
Obviously, the patent system was in need of some help, and a lot of people think 
that Andrei has come to the rescue, or at least is starting the rescue operation. We’ll see 
what his perspective is on it. 
MR. IANCU: Thank you. It’s good to see everybody. It’s also good to see that we 
are still part of the morning session. 
Lots and lots of things are going on in the patent world and at the USPTO. 
However, given the circumstances, I’m going to speak only about one issue. It seems to be 
everybody’s favorite issue anyway. It happens to be that I think this is the most important 
issue of substantive patent law currently, and that is Section 1011 patentable subject matter. 
To me, this issue must be fixed, must be addressed now, in the United States. The 
status quo ante, prior to our guidance in January of this year simply was unworkable for 
many reasons, and we must address it. 
I think there is broad-based consensus that the state of the law is unworkable. You 
don’t have to just take my word for it coming from the USPTO, but industry in general 
across the board has a similar view. Obviously, nobody agrees 100 percent on all the 
problems or how to solve them and so on, but there is broad-based consensus that 
something needs to be done. 
So what has happened? The fact of the matter is that the statute itself basically has 
not changed since 1793 when Jefferson and Madison wrote it. It worked pretty well for 
200-some years until five, six, ten years ago. Obviously, the statute hasn’t changed — 
something else has changed in the past five to ten years — and it’s not a big mystery: recent 
case law has created significant confusion in this regard. 
But it doesn’t have to be this way. It wasn’t for 200-some years. We can fix it. 
What are some of the key principles? 
First and foremost, we need to remember that the 1952 Patent Act2 separated the 
categories of eligibility, which is Section 101 of the current Patent Code, from the 
conditions for patentability, which are Sections 102,3 103,4 and 1125 of the Patent Code. 
We must not mix them up again. 
Section 101 patentable subject matter is about what is per se, by itself, not 
patentable, not part of the useful arts, not part of a useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter — by itself, per se, what is not meant to be in the patent system. 
If we look at all the cases really from the beginning of time of our patent system, 
they basically are math, pure unapplied mathematics; compositions of matter or natural 
principles, scientific principles and the like; human interactions, like economic principles; 
and mental processes. These are the broad-based categories. Every single Supreme Court 
 
1 35 U.S.C. §101. 
2 35 U.S.C. §§1-293. 
3 35 U.S.C. §102. 
4 35 U.S.C. §103. 
5 35 U.S.C. §112. 
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case dealt with facts that included these four basic categories, and most Federal Circuit 
cases as well. 
But we have deviated in recent years in the way we think about it and in the way 
we apply it, and certain mistakes have been made. What are some of those mistakes in the 
application of these basic principles? 
One is the application of these exclusions to all types of matters, to all types of 
technology, even if it is not per se problematic. I think this is contrary to what the Supreme 
Court has said to date. Applying exclusions to Section 101 patentable subject matter in the 
United States to matter that is by itself not per se problematic, to matter that is 
technological, to matter that is not one of those four categories that I mentioned, goes 
beyond what the Supreme Court has said, and certainly is nowhere to be found in the statute 
itself. That is one place where the analysis has deviated. 
A second place is by considering that claims in patents that are perhaps vague or 
indefinite or functionally oriented create a Section 101 problem. They do not. That 
conflates the statutes that the 1952 Patent Code separated. Those are Section 112 problems. 
Another problem is considering claims under Section 101 for inventiveness, 
considering whether claims have an inventive concept in them, questions of newness so to 
speak in Section 101; taking things that were done manually before and, for example, 
putting them on a computer — you see analyses that say “doing it on a computer” is 
ineligible, without regard to what the “it” might be — so combinations of regular activities, 
technological activities, automated on a computer, those combinations effectively of prior 
art, have been found to be problematic under Section 101, and that actually should be done 
under Section 103. We know the standards. We know how to combine prior art. 
There are other issues as well, but I will leave them to the side for now. 
The USPTO has looked at all these cases, and in January we provided guidance to 
our examiners that tries to synthesize the case law and make these basic points. 
First and foremost — and this is the most critical aspect of our guidance and I think 
the way the analysis should be done — you must look and see whether the claims contain 
something that is per se by itself problematic. If they do not, you are basically done with 
the Section 101 exclusion analysis. If they do, then you can consider whether you have a 
practical application or not, which is entirely consistent with court decisions. 
What will happen now that we have the guidelines? 
First of all, the USPTO examination results so far have been fantastic. Our 
examiners really appreciate the new approach. It has created more consistency. It has 
created more time for them to deal with prior art searching and § 102, § 103, and § 112 
analyses. It should increase the quality overall of the examination. 
What will the courts do? We don’t know. We have an independent judiciary. They 
are not bound by our guidelines, obviously. They have not yet addressed them per se. 
However, having said that, the decisions that keep issuing from the Federal Circuit 
seem to be entirely consistent with what they have been doing for the past few years. I have 
not yet seen in any significant way a change in the way they approach the analysis itself. 
This leaves Congress. As we heard earlier, there are efforts in Congress, and we 
will see where that leads. 
I will stop there. I am quite optimistic. I think we have provided a framework that 
works, and I think that, whether through courts or Congress, if folks follow the framework 
as a general matter, the matter is resolved. 
Generally speaking, foreign jurisdictions have addressed this issue, and we must 
do the same here in the United States. 
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PROF. HANSEN: Thank you. 
Let me ask this. You have two groups that you have to worry about within your 
guidelines. One is your own examiners, and you have 2.5 million — how many examiners 
do you have? 
MR. IANCU: About 8500 examiners. 
PROF. HANSEN: And they spread all over. 
MR. IANCU: Yes. 
PROF. HANSEN: Do you have some supervisory device, because they have been 
following the Supreme Court, for checking to see whether the examiners are going to 
change the way they do examination, or do you just rely on them to do it without much 
supervision? 
MR. IANCU: First, we have had training; virtually all 8500 of them have been 
trained. The applicants themselves need to push the examiners to follow the guidelines. 
Now I think they will follow the guidelines. If they do not, applicants can appeal to the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in ex parte appeals, and hopefully the issue will be 
addressed there as well. The guidelines do apply to the PTAB as well. 
PROF. HANSEN: To what extent does the PTAB have a mind of their own, or are 
they under control? 
MR. IANCU: The PTAB judges and the examiners have minds of their own. 
Having said that, the guidelines bind the examination process for all personnel at the 
USPTO. They do not change the law; they just synthesize the law. It’s an approach, it’s a 
framework of analysis, the steps you do in the analysis. As far as we can tell, the PTAB so 
far — it has been three months — has been applying the guidelines. 
PROF. HANSEN: Finally, are you saying that the Federal Circuit is already 
onboard because they have pretty much followed the Supreme Court and now you are 
concerned about them continuing to follow the Supreme Court? 
MR. IANCU: If you look at the Supreme Court cases, by themselves those cases 
are not necessarily the ones that have caused the current predicament. In the way those 
cases have been interpreted afterwards by whoever, whether it’s the lower courts or 
actually at the USPTO itself, over the past number of years we have deviated from the core 
message of the Supreme Court to some extent. 
Now, the Supreme Court may disagree if they take up another case, but the fact of 
the matter is that to date the Federal Circuit has only addressed Section 101 exclusions vis-
à-vis categories of matter that are per se ineligible. So you have, for example, in Benson,6 
Flook,7 and Diamond v. Diehr,8 all math-based questions; Diamond v. Chakrabarty,9 a 
natural phenomenon case; Alice10 and Bilski11 both fundamentally economic principle cases 
— matter that by itself would never be considered so far by the courts as part of the useful 
arts. 
The problem has come in later, after we have somewhat gone beyond those issues, 
and now we are treating technological patents or technological matter as coming somehow 
within the scope of these exclusions. By focusing the analysis, by organizing the analysis 
 
6 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
7 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
8 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
9 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
10 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).  
11 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
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so that we can first identify whether we have per se problematic subject matter, I think we 
will have less of an opportunity to make a mistake. Let me put it that way. 
PROF. HANSEN: Okay. Thank you. 
Any questions or comments from the panelists or the audience? 
QUESTION [Donald Dunner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner 
LLP, Washington, D.C.]: Are you saying that the Federal Circuit can fix the problem right 
now without further Supreme Court intervention, without congressional intervention, and, 
in particular, given the strong dissent by Judge Lourie and Judge Moore in the Ariosa12 
case that lamented the fact that this great invention could not be patented, that they could 
actually change their view on that, as Judge Newman did? Judge Newman is already there 
and now thinks that you can have a diagnostic method such as was involved in that case 
and still pass muster. 
MR. IANCU: I don’t know if completely, but if the Federal Circuit wanted to do 
it — and that’s important — I think they can to a large extent fix the problem. 
I have suggested, as I said at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust 
Law Spring Meeting two or three weeks ago, that the Federal Circuit could take a few cases 
en banc, get amicus input, hear from the government, and have a one-day broad-based 
discussion on some specific cases to try to address the matter. 
But yes, to a large extent I do think if they wish, they could fix it, certainly on the 
abstract idea front and on the diagnostic front. Take the Athena13 case for example. Judge 
Newman saw a distinction and she wrote a vigorous dissent in the Athena case. She did not 
think that in that case those claims had to be invalid in light of Supreme Court guidance.  
So there is a path, but I have not yet seen any broad-based consensus at the Federal 
Circuit to want to move in that direction. If that’s true, then we are left with legislation as 
a necessity. 
PROF. HANSEN: Okay. Thank you. 
Judge Newman, by the way, was going to be here, but she wasn’t able to make the 
Conference. I am not a patent person, but when I read the decisions, I always think Judge 
Newman is exceptionally good. 
Thank you very much. 
Paul Michel, former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, what do you think? How 
long have you not been on the Federal Circuit? 
JUDGE MICHEL: Nine years. 
PROF. HANSEN: What grade would you give the Federal Circuit since you’ve 
left? 
JUDGE MICHEL: C overall — As and Fs, as stated before, yielding an average of 
C. But in the Section 101 area pretty bad. 
PROF. HANSEN: All right. 
JUDGE MICHEL: You know, they are trapped. The Supreme Court has trapped 
itself by ancient dicta going back to the 1800s. It has treated patent law not as commercial 
law but as if it were constitutional law where everything has to ultimately be decided by 
judges and not by private parties or government agencies, and it has adopted terminology 
that is just intellectually bankrupt. It is incoherent to talk about “directed to,” “significantly 
more,” “inventive concept,” “markedly different,” “basic building blocks of science,” 
 
12 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Lourie, J., concurring). 
13 Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019).   
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“laws of nature,” “natural phenomena.” These are terms not known in science, with no 
prior clear meaning. They were not defined by the Supreme Court when they used, and 
repeatedly used, these terms. I think that they are really undefinable. 
It seems to me we are in a very big trap, and that is equally so in the electronic area 
as in the human health area, and the results are counterproductive for the advance of 
technology and for economic growth and job growth because investment is deterred by 
uncertainty, and massive uncertainty is the main result of the Supreme Court’s quartet of 
cases. 
And it is not even just because you get inconsistent, unexplainable results and 
irreconcilable precedents in the Federal Circuit itself, not to mention among 1000 trial 
judges scattered across the country. I think the Federal Circuit, if it would go en banc along 
the line of what the Director has suggested, could solve about a quarter to a third of the 
total scope of the problem. But the rest will require legislation. 
I can tell you as the former Chief Judge that getting the court to go en banc was 
never easy. It takes seven votes out of the twelve active judges. Some judges almost never 
want to go en banc, and others don’t want to go en banc because they like a decision they 
wrote as a panel member which they don’t want to be in jeopardy of being modified or 
overruled by the full court. That problem has gotten worse in the nearly a decade since I 
was there, so I’m not too optimistic that they will do what Andrei usefully suggests. They 
might. If they do, they could help, but they really can’t solve the problem. 
The Supreme Court has the whole country completely trapped. The whole point 
here really is not to encourage inventors as much as it is to encourage investors, because 
most invention takes money, often a lot of money, from R&D right down through product 
production and everything in between. Serial investments have to be made. Money 
managers have fiduciary and other obligations, and so they are interested in return on 
investment — how big is the risk; how long will it be until there is any return; will the 
return be adequate; can I predict any of the above factors? 
Under the Section 101 case law, the answer is, “Well, no you really can’t.” So, 
when in doubt, the people who manage money, whether venture capitalists or pension fund 
directors or private equity people, don’t do it. So what are they doing? They are investing 
more and more in entertainment instead of real technology and the investments, particularly 
at the VC (Venture Capitalist) level, in real technology have plummeted. If you look at the 
percentage of total VC money invested in semiconductors now compared to ten years ago, 
it’s less than 1 percent of what it used to be as a proportion of the total. That is just an 
indicator. I don’t want to make too much of that. 
We are in a very negative downward spiral. And, because so much is global — 
science is global, commerce is global, money is global and mobile — what is happening? 
In addition to the shift from hard technology to entertainment on the part of investment 
decisions, there is a shift overseas. Now more and more U.S. VC money that used to be 
invested here is being invested elsewhere — Europe, Asia, China — and quite properly, 
because the return on investment is better there because eligibility is wider, certainty is 
higher, and the risks are lower. That will keep happening unless and until the public 
authorities here who control broad policy have an epiphany and do something about this 
tremendous problem. 
I want to compliment our friends — many, many visitors from Europe, Asia, and 
elsewhere — because all of you in my view have done a much better job providing much 
more clarity, predictability, certainty, reliability, and other things that intellectual property 
rights desperately need if they are going to function for their purpose. So good for you, bad 
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for us, and sorry that when you come here you have all the risks and unpredictability that 
we have when we are operating domestically. 
I think legislation really is the only solution. I would have had the view that the 
Supreme Court, having spoken schizophrenically in Mayo,14 Alice, and some of the other 
cases, would have intervened. But Bilski was nine years ago, Mayo seven years ago, Alice 
five years ago, and in between they have turned down every petition for certiorari that 
would have allowed them to straighten out the mess.  
So I conclude — maybe I’m too impatient — that the Supreme Court has no 
intention of straightening out the mess. The Federal Circuit — we’ve already covered that. 
Obviously, the district judges cannot do anything. So I am hoping for efforts in Congress 
to be focused and balanced and give us a solution here. 
PROF. HANSEN: Wow! 
I don’t think the Supreme Court actually knew what they were getting into. Part of 
it is Justice Breyer had this big dissent and moaned about them not taking cases; and then, 
all of a sudden, they took a case basically for Breyer and they gave it to Breyer; and then 
they said, “Oh my God, look what has happened!” Now they’re trying to temper back, and 
that doesn’t seem to be working. 
I think you are right that the Supreme Court doesn’t want to go near this anymore. 
I don’t know — maybe that’s good, maybe that’s not good — but I don’t think that is 
probably going to happen. Do you disagree with that? 
MR. IANCU: I agree with some of what you just said. I agree that it is not highly 
likely that the Supreme Court is going to look at the issue again. If they do, who knows if 
they are going to make it better? It could actually go the other way. 
I will say that we have seen an increased number of requests from the Supreme 
Court this past year for the government’s views on Section 101 cases. For example, both 
the Vanda15 and the Berkheimer16 cases that were discussed in the prior panel are now at 
the Supreme Court and they are seeking the government’s views. I’m not saying that those 
are the right cases, but in any event, they are looking at the issue. 
I don’t disagree with the concept that from a practical point of view legislation 
may be the only path here.  
My point is that the legislation has not changed since 1793. This predicament that 
we are in now was not caused by a shift in legislation. This predicament was caused by a 
new interpretation by the judiciary of the legislation. 
Obviously, the judiciary, should it want to, can fix it. Again, I don’t yet see broad-
based evidence that they want to; and, even if they do want to address it with a unified 
voice, I don’t yet see the evidence that it would be in a direction that solves it. So we’ll see 
what happens. 
But, look, the fact is legislation is unpredictable too, and any new words that the 
Congress will put in there will have to be interpreted again by the courts by definition. So 
I think to suggest that with a stroke of a pen Congress can wipe this away and we are going 
to wake up one morning and everything is going to be hunky-dory — if the courts are not 
in it, I think (a) we are far away from that, and (b) to some extent it is unlikely because, no 
matter what, the courts have to be in it, obviously. 
 
14 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).  
15 Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020).  
16 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
911 (2020).  
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PROF. HANSEN: Is one of the problems that to some degree the courts have lost 
faith in IP protection, they are not as sure that strong protection, especially in patents, is 
right, and there are some who definitely think it is wrong; whereas before it was, I would 
think, more generally agreed that IP protection is good? Is that part of the problem? And, 
as you say, even if Congress does something, those people will still be around who can 
nitpick or do something else. 
JUDGE MICHEL: Well, as you know, in Bilski former Justice Kennedy wrote that 
the so-called “implied exceptions” — that’s the label for their interventions — had become 
settled as a matter of what he called “statutory stare decisis.”17 I’m not sure what that 
means. That doesn’t make a lot of sense to me. But I translate it this way into everyday 
language: “Congress has never told us to stop doing this, so we are going to keep doing it.” 
In my view, Congress should explicitly overrule at least the four recent cases — 
maybe also Flook and Benson, but certainly the four most recent cases — and then I think 
the Supreme Court would get the message. 
Consider this: the Supreme Court quartet of cases was unnecessary because 
Sections 102, 103, and 112 solve 99.9 percent of the problems without needing Section 
101. But Breyer came along in Mayo and said, “No, no, the implied exceptions are better 
established than Section 103.” That just makes no sense to me. 
I think that is unnecessary, unwise, unadministrable fairly, unscientific, but also 
undemocratic, because we have nine appointed Justices making broad national innovation 
policy in the United States instead of 535 democratically elected representatives of the 
people in a patent system that is entirely statutory.  
This isn’t like First Amendment law. This is commercial law based on a detailed 
statute, and the Supreme Court doesn’t even pretend to be interpreting any word in Section 
101; they just make stuff up. To me it’s an illicit encroachment on the prerogatives and 
duties of the Congress and Congress ought to reclaim its rightful role. 
PROF. HANSEN: We don’t have time for further discussion — this has been 
great! — but I want to give you both a chance. Would you bet all the money you and all 
your relatives have that Congress will produce a good solution or Congress will not 
produce, and if you guess wrong, you’re bankrupt? I could have said everyone in your 
family is murdered, but I thought that was too extreme, so we’ll just go with bankrupt. 
JUDGE MICHEL: I predict it is more likely than not that over the course of the 
next two to four years there will be a statute. It won’t be perfect, but it will be a huge 
improvement over the status quo, and I am happy to settle for that. The basis of my 
confidence is that the outflow of investment money and the relocation of labs and the flight 
of talent that is likely to continue and accelerate will finally become so clear that Congress 
will realize that This is a job killer; this is a killer of technological leadership; this might 
even have national security impacts that are negative for the United States. As those things 
become clearer and clearer, the motivation and the resolve to act will go up very, very 
rapidly. So I am predicting by 2021 that we will have a statute that is much better than what 
we have now. 
PROF. HANSEN: Are you going to personally go to the Hill and talk to people? 
JUDGE MICHEL: I’ve been doing that constantly. 
PROF. HANSEN: Good. 
MR. IANCU: I generally agree with Judge Michel. The status quo is simply 
unworkable. It is harming American innovation. It is harming American investment. Most 
 
17 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
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importantly, it is becoming a national security issue because if we are on the cusp of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) here, we cannot and should not relinquish our leading 
technological edge. If our laws are unclear and unpredictable, then we stand to risk all of 
that.  
And I think Congress sees that. Unless courts fix the path they have put us on — 
and, as I said, I don’t currently see any evidence that is about to happen — then I think 
legislators will step in.  
They are stepping in. The folks who are speaking up are indicating that they are 
planning to introduce a bill by this summer, and then we will see where it goes from there. 
But I am encouraged that the efforts are both bipartisan and bicameral and they are moving 
in parallel. 
JUDGE MICHEL: Hugh, there’s another angle here. I spent nine years as a Senate 
staffer in a prior life. It is true that legislation is a slow, tortuous process, and you can never 
quite guarantee the final outcome until the bill is signed by a president. 
On the other hand, I have seen innumerable examples of where the courts were 
going in a crazy direction and then a legislative solution was crafted by leaders such as we 
have now — as the Director has alluded to, bipartisan and bicameral — and when there are 
hearings, then there is a markup, and then a bill goes to the floor, at least in one body, the 
whole calculus changes. The media starts echoing that there’s a big problem here, and not 
only is it likely that will help get legislation passed, but, even short of enactment, the courts 
will start backtracking. They are very political at the Supreme Court level. They are paying 
intense attention to every headline, every televised hearing, every bill that is moving 
forward in the process. 
We don’t have to choose between do we want legislation or do we want a court 
fix. We should bet on both horses and they will work in tandem. 
PROF. HANSEN: Good. 
By the way, we were going to have two Federal Circuit judges here, Judge 
O’Malley and Polly Newman, which would have been great for this panel, but both 
unfortunately were unable to make it. I’m sorry about that. 
Thank you very much. 
Now we have the new Register of Copyrights. Congratulations on that 
appointment. 
MS. TEMPLE: Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: It’s very good to have Karyn with us. She is going to be talking 
about a new era in copyright legislation. 
MS. TEMPLE: Great. Thank you, Hugh. It’s a pleasure to be here. 
Call me an optimist, but I sense a change in the air in terms of the ability of the 
United States to actually enact copyright legislation. 
Updating the copyright law has often been an arduous and, dare I say, painful 
process. It took more than twenty years for us to update the 1976 Act,18 and that process 
actually began in the 1950s. 
Fast-forward to the United States’ updates to address the digital age and term, 
which occurred more than twenty years ago with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act19 
and the copyright term extension in 1998. 
Since then, there have been only minor and kind of technical corrections to the 
copyright law — until now. 
 
18 Copyright Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
19 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).  
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A critical issue that has affected the atmosphere for copyright legislation occurred 
in 2011–2012, when we were considering legislative efforts to address online piracy. 
SOPA20/PIPA21 will probably long live in infamy in terms of a cautionary tale of how not 
to get copyright legislation passed. I think it is still spoken of in whispers in some quarters, 
so I am taking a daring step to even mention it here. 
PROF. HANSEN: Why don’t you tell the audience a little bit about what 
happened? 
MS. TEMPLE: Yes. In my speech I actually have some of that background. 
It’s the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA). There 
was an issue that I think most people could agree on, that online piracy was rampant and 
that current efforts were not really having the impact that was needed to comprehensively 
address the issue. 
But critics, I think, will say that the content side went a little bit too far and 
overestimated its influence and the emerging might of the Internet, as well as the need to 
have consensus in the Internet age on broad legislation, and that is consensus of all key 
players — content, tech, and the public. 
So provisions that already existed or processes that already existed elsewhere — 
we heard about the United Kingdom having some website-blocking legislation or a 
blocking mechanism since 2011 — came to an inglorious end in the United States. 
Initially, SOPA had thirty-two sponsors and PIPA had forty-two sponsors, many 
of whom defected before it was over.  
Slogans such as “Don’t Break the Internet,” “Stop Internet Censorship,” “PIPA 
and SOPA! How About NOPA?” and my personal favorite “SOPA means LOSER in 
Swedish,” became common parlance, and most of the public was actually convinced that 
the legislation would literally break the Internet. 
PROF. HANSEN: Of course it wasn’t the public. It was some people working out 
of their bathrooms on the Internet. [Laughter] 
MS. TEMPLE: Right, which aren’t the public — but yes. 
And, in a bit of irony I would say, the Internet was actually broken for a day 
intentionally by some tech companies themselves that had thought of an Internet Blackout 
Day,22 where Wikipedia, Reddit, and others went down for the day to demonstrate what 
they contended would be the result if those pieces of legislation had passed. 
Since that kind of happy confluence of copyright controversy occurred, legislation 
on IP has often been blackballed simply by branding it with the “Scarlet Letter A” of being 
“the next great SOPA and PIPA.” 
The CLASSICS Act,23 which would have addressed pre-1972 sound recordings, 
was actually called “the next SOPA/PIPA”; The Register of Copyrights Selection and 
Accountability Act was called “the next SOPA/PIPA,” although it had nothing to do with 
IP enforcement; and there were a number of areas, even internationally, where the term 
“SOPA and PIPA” was applied to all sorts of different provisions. 
 
20 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
21 Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
22 On January 18, 2012, in protest of SOPA and PIPA, several websites coordinated a 
shutdown. See David A. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Web Sites, WASH. POST, (Jan. 
18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl 
6P_story.html?utm_term=.37515a5b4226. 
23 Compensating Legacy Artists for their Songs, Service, and Important Contributions to 
Society Act, H.R. 3301, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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Congress didn’t even want to consider enforcement of any kind. And at the time 
that the then Register of Copyright Maria Pallante called for The Next Great Copyright Act 
in 2015, many were very, very skeptical that there could be any legislation passed in 
Congress on copyright. 
I think certain things have changed since that initial call for The Next Great 
Copyright Act. Content and tech did begin partnering on numerous issues rather than 
opposing each other. The Rap Genius website agreed to license with the Music Publishers 
of America (MPA) in May 2014. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and 
Donuts established a voluntary partnership to reduce online piracy in February 2016. 
YouTube signed a new music licensing deal with Sony and Universal Music Group in 
December 2017. Facebook signed music licensing deals with all three major labels in 
March 2018. Netflix joined the MPAA in January of this year.  
And I think tech has also received its own amount of criticism, which some have 
called the “techlash,” which has partially changed the political context in which these 
policy conversations are now taking place. And, of course, other countries have continued 
to legislate in these areas. 
So I think both sides, so to speak, had something to gain by actually working 
together when it came to copyright legislation. 
The Music Modernization Act24 (MMA) was able to cross that finish line in 
relatively quick fashion. The Copyright Office wrote its Music Licensing Report25 in 2015. 
The first recent music bill, including components of what became the MMA, was 
introduced in the House at the end of March 2017, there was a hearing on the MMA in 
May 2018, and the law was actually passed and signed by October 2018. That is actually a 
relatively quick, and I would say painless — maybe some lobbyists wouldn’t agree, but I 
would say painless — process in terms of getting what will now probably be considered 
one of the most significant pieces of legislation passed. 
Other recent examples outside the copyright space demonstrate the changing 
dynamics.  
In 2018 legislation was introduced to amend Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act,26 which excluded sex trafficking: the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act 
(SESTA)27 and Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA).28 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which was a key player in the SOPA/PIPA 
debate, called it “a dangerous bill that would lead to censorship.” Others, like Fight for the 
Future, directly accused it of being “the next SOPA/PIPA” and said that it would literally 
break the Internet. But that bill passed with the support of the Internet Association. 
So what’s on the horizon that might benefit from this copyright team spirit that I’m 
hoping exists? 
• Small Claims. This is something that we have pushed in the Copyright Office for 
some time. There was a hearing last December, so we’re hopeful that small claims will 
finally be able to get across the finish line. 
• Enforcement. No, not SOPA/PIPA Part 2, but an actual real dialogue based on 
concrete facts on enforcement issues. 
 
24 Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018). 
25 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE (2015). 
26 47 U.S.C §230. 
27 S. 516, 115th Cong. (2017). 
28 Pub. L. No. 115-164 (2018). 
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• Other reforms to the music system that were not addressed in the MMA but that 
will continue to help the music system become updated. 
So it is a new day, hopefully, for copyright legislation. We are ready in the 
Copyright Office to get to work on it and are very, very hopeful that, given the dynamics 
and copyright team spirit that is among content, tech, and the public, that we will be able 
to actually be very active and get small claims, enforcement issues like felony streaming, 
and orphan works finally across the finish line. 
Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: I feel 100 percent better now. Excellent. 
Panel, anyone? Audience, anyone? 
[No response] 
MS. TEMPLE: We all agree. Thank you very much. 
PROF. HANSEN: A tremendous presentation. I’m going to be able to sleep tonight 
now after that presentation. This morning I was almost suicidal listening to some of the 
panels, but this has been great. 
Our next speaker is Maria Martin-Prat, who has been here for many years as part 
of DG-III and DG Growth, and now DG Trade. Just entre nous, did you like better working 
in DG Growth or DG Trade? 
MS. MARTIN-PRAT: I never worked in DG Growth.  
PROF. HANSEN: DG III was DG Growth, wasn’t it? 
MS. MARTIN-PRAT: I used to work in the Internal Market Directorate General 
of the Commission and now I am in DG Trade. I enjoyed both. 
PROF. HANSEN: All right. Let’s proceed. 
MS. MARTIN-PRAT: I am going to try to cover the current state of IP 
international norm setting, and I am going to look at two issues very quickly. The first one 
is the question, which I think is increasingly important, of whether we are going towards 
further convergence, increasing divergence, or managed diversity in terms of IP rules 
worldwide. The second relates to the fact that there are ongoing discussions on issues such 
as forced technology transfer or digital trade that I believe are going to play an increasingly 
important role in terms of IP protection. 
As to the first question — at least I think; some in the room may disagree — it has 
become clear that we might have left behind the time where we could agree on big 
multilateral IP treaties. It is true that there has been IP norm setting at the international 
level in the last two decades, but it has often been on very specific issues, often as well 
related to improving or completing existing treaties or agreements. 
Now, an absence of international norm setting does not necessarily mean 
divergence of national rules. First of all, some areas are already highly integrated in the 
sense that there is a good common set of rules at the international level. We also often 
already have seen parallel legislative developments in different jurisdictions, particularly 
when technology evolves. Also, we do continue to have bilateral and plurilateral trade 
agreements that normally include IP chapters and also help in setting international 
standards.  
However, if you look today at both national law and trade agreements, my 
impression is that we may be going towards more of a divergence than convergence, and 
this is likely to continue. It is a trend that should worry us in view of the fact that we are 
increasingly in front of global markets and cross-border services. 
If you look at national laws, I think we will all agree there are going to be marked 
differences, at least for a while, for instance, between the U.S. legislation and the EU 
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legislation in terms of how we address issues such as publishers’ rights, or certainly the 
rules for ISPs. 
We have had also other developments in Europe recently, for example, with regard 
to Supplementary Protection Certificates for patents that also seem to be moving towards 
divergence. 
This is not the first time that we might have divergent views between, for instance, 
the European Union and the United States, and I think geographical indications is the 
seminal example. Nevertheless, I think it is undeniable that differences when they emerge 
affect stakeholders across many jurisdictions. 
The same happens when you look at trade agreements these days. Now that we 
have more of them that are being concluded, so the network of trade agreements is 
thickening, it is quite interesting to engage in a comparison of their IP chapters. 
If you take, for instance, the IP chapter in the U.S.–Mexico–Canada agreement and 
the IP chapter in the free trade agreement that is now almost concluded between the 
European Union and Mexico and compare those with the Trans-Pacific Partnership IP 
chapter, you will see a degree of diversity in their norms. It will be interesting to see how 
this managed diversity is going to be applied when you will have players present in all 
those countries. And you could do the same exercise with other networks of agreements 
that include the European Union, Japan, Singapore, etc. In a way, what we are seeing is 
increasing accommodation of divergence. A further sign of divergence can be found in the 
provisions of the IP chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership that were suspended after the 
United States decided not to go ahead with its conclusion. 
So that’s what we see in terms of norm setting. 
There is another aspect that I think is quite interesting when you look at what is 
happening more generally in trade and investment discussions. 
The most important discussion on IP today is likely to be related to forced 
technology transfer. I’m sure all of you follow these discussions. They are very present in 
this country, in particular, after the United States imposed tariffs of $250 billion on Chinese 
goods following the findings in the Section 301 Report29 of large-scale intellectual property 
theft in China. 
The European Commission disagrees with a number of the methods used by the 
United States but does agree with the identification of the underlying problem. We do agree 
that one of the greatest challenges we have today in terms of IP protection is forced 
technology transfer, which is an issue mostly related to trade and investment law but also, 
obviously, related to weak IP rules or enforcement systems, notably in the areas of patents 
and trade secrets, and also to the lack of a clear recognition of market principles and 
freedom of contract for IP transactions. 
Forced technology transfer is an important point in the agenda of a number of 
players, like the United States, Japan, and the European Union; talks as to a possible 
plurilateral discussion of those matters in the World Trade Organization (WTO); and also 
negotiations about to start now in the WTO on digital trade or electronic commerce, which 
are likely as well to have a radical impact on IP protection, in particular if some issues such 
as ISP liability are included. 
In conclusion, in my view we will be going now towards a time where bilateral 
and plurilateral negotiations will be the main vehicle for further IP norm setting at the 
 
29 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION 301 REPORT INTO CHINA’S ACTS, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INNOVATION (2018). 
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international level. And we will be in a phase of managed diversity, which is nevertheless 
sustained by a solid basis of common rules established in existing international conventions 
and the TRIPs Agreement. In parallel, I think we will see negotiations on trade and 
investment that are also likely to play an increasingly important role in the shaping and the 
effective exercise of IP rules. 
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you very much. 
Any comments or thoughts from anywhere? 
QUESTION [Angus Lang, Tenth Floor Selborne/Wentworth Chambers, Sydney]: 
You mentioned that we are in a phase of managed divergence. I wonder about two possible 
mechanisms for managing it, or perhaps that might be alternative mechanisms for norm 
convergence. 
One, in a world where more and more aspects of life are governed by data flows, 
in particular cross-border data flows, themselves areas of technology that may or not 
become more standardized, but the standard-setting bodies for all of those aspects of life 
might become de facto norm or rule makers rather than the more conventional mechanisms 
that are used, so the influence of supranational standard-setting bodies in various fields. 
Second, the possible role of international investment courts under the auspices of 
investment traders in the divergence between norms. 
MS. MARTIN-PRAT: I think that is more a comment than a question. I do agree 
that in the absence of sufficient agreement to set rules at the multilateral level, which from 
my point of view is the ideal objective, you do face instances in which the standards are 
set by the bigger players. We are all rushing in terms of seeing who is first to set certain 
standards, and there are new important players there, China being one of them. 
I was not referring to traditional investment treaties when talking about agreements 
that may shape IP, but rather more generally to trade and investment agreements or trade 
in general, for the specific issue of forced technology transfer.  
PROF. HANSEN: How difficult is it to do convergence, for instance? 
Convergence with whom? Is it the Member States? Also you have the courts and foreign 
trade involving 18,000 different jurisdictions. In terms of actually producing a situation 
where there is some convergence, would you say it is very difficult; no, it is okay because 
people want it; or what? What do you think? 
MS. MARTIN-PRAT: Convergence is very difficult; it is increasingly difficult. 
Anyone who has been following international negotiations for the last thirty years realizes 
that and anyone who sees what is happening in WIPO and WTO realizes that. 
I am leaving aside convergence with EU Member States. That is our daily work. 
That is part of how we function. 
In terms of the convergence of rules with other big players, it is complex. I think 
it is easier to try to focus on very specific issues. But some of the issues we would like to 
address will require the engagement of certain players as well that may not be willing to 
engage, or not willing to engage on the terms that we want them to engage. That is a 
challenge that is faced by the European Union, by the United States, by Japan, by many 
other jurisdictions, in particular when wanting to bring onboard other emerging, very 
important players. China is clearly one of those. 
PROF. HANSEN: A question over there? 
QUESTION [George York, Recording Industry Association of America]: Maria, 
you mentioned a point on which I think there is a fair amount of consensus, that the arc of 
history, the arc of trade negotiations, is moving from multilateral to both bilateral and 
plurilateral.  
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I wonder, though, how sustainable is that new paradigm of bilateral and 
plurilateral? The Council just recently adopted a very narrow set of terms to engage on in 
negotiations with the United States, for example, limited to a few key areas but not a 
comprehensive negotiation. 
To what extent are there other alternatives to pursuing the promotion of IP norm 
setting that are maybe not at the trade agreement level but still could be bilateral and 
plurilateral — for example, through working groups, through trade preference programs 
incentivizing implementing IP norms and other mechanisms?  
MS. MARTIN-PRAT: I thought George was going to ask about geographical 
indications. Good you left that behind. 
On the issue of whether it is sustainable to continue with a network that is 
thickening, as I was saying, of bilateral or plurilateral agreements, that is a good question. 
I don’t know whether we are going to be able to have an alternative, but I don’t think it is 
ideal. Again, if you look at specific issues of IP protection, whether it is the length of a 
term of protection or the type of coverage of enforcement provisions, they are different. 
When Mexico discusses with the European Union or when Mexico discusses with the rest 
of the countries of the Trans-Pacific Partnership or when Mexico discusses with the United 
States, it is bound to at some point create some problems. 
Are there alternatives to that in terms of rule-making? One path that is increasingly 
being considered now in the context of WTO is plurilaterals, plurilaterals that may not be 
at the moment specific on IP, but, as I was saying, may include forced technology transfer 
related provisions, and clearly, we are starting to discuss digital trade. 
Besides norm setting, I think efforts have to continue in the area of enforcement of 
the existing rules. There is already a big base of common rules on which we can work. So 
yes, there is a lot of work that can be done. 
But that does not take away the fact that at some point, for some issues, ideally we 
will want to have new common rules agreed, at least at the plurilateral if not the multilateral 
level. 
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you very much. 
Andrew Finch, what’s going on in the Antitrust Division these days? 
MR. FINCH: To return the conversation a little bit to something that Nick spoke 
about on the last panel, we are very focused on where the antitrust laws can apply to 
standard-development organizations (SDOs) and standard-setting organizations (SSOs). 
PROF. HANSEN: One of the remarkable things about this Administration is the 
USPTO has produced wonderful guidelines and the Antitrust Division is taking a position 
with regard to IP that is heretical compared to the traditional “Nine No-No’s” and 
everything else, which is quite remarkable, and from my point of view obviously very 
welcome. 
Why don’t you proceed? 
MR. FINCH: Sure. Thank you for the invitation to be here. It is really nice to be 
an antitrust lawyer in front of a group of IP lawyers because I speak a lot to antitrust groups 
and it’s refreshing to see so many unfamiliar faces out there. 
As Hugh mentioned, we are going through a bit of a “rebalancing,” we’ve called 
it, although I don’t think it’s an adjustment that is off to one end of the swing of the 
pendulum; it’s actually bringing it back towards the middle.  
I attribute part of that to the fact that the Head of the Antitrust Division, Makan 
Delrahim, started off practicing law as a patent lawyer, and he is the first Head of the 
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Antitrust Division who was previously a practicing patent lawyer. That informs a lot of his 
views on the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law. 
He gave a speech not long after he was confirmed as Assistant Attorney General 
in which he talked about what he called the “New Madison” approach to intellectual 
property rights and antitrust.30 He said that we have to acknowledge that the patent right is 
embodied in the Constitution. As Hugh mentioned earlier, the only place in the original 
Constitution the word “right” appears is in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8; and not only is it 
the word “right,” it’s the words “exclusive right.” That’s important because the founding 
document of our government recognizes the importance in patent law of the right to 
exclude.  
That informs our interpretation and application of antitrust law. The Sherman Act31 
is old — it was passed in 1890 — but it’s not that old; it’s not as old as the Constitution. 
The fact that the exclusive right is in the Constitution is something that is very important 
to us and has played an important role in helping us articulate our current position on 
standard-setting organizations. 
How does antitrust fit into this? This morning I was reminded of that famous 
Ronald Reagan quote, which I will adapt here, which would say there are probably no more 
frightening words to a bunch of IP lawyers than “I’m from the Antitrust Division and I’m 
here to help.” [Laughter] 
But what we see is a lack of balance over the last decade or so in antitrust law, 
particularly in the way the enforcement agencies have been applying antitrust law to the 
conduct of standard-essential patent holders in particular. 
What I mean by that is there was a view that was publicized and adopted by a 
number of enforcement agencies around the world that the breach of a fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) commitment in and of itself could give rise to an antitrust 
claim. That is a concern for us because it is inconsistent with the right to exclude — and 
I’ll come back to that. But it is also concerning because it suggests that there is somehow 
a treble-damages claim that should flow from an allegation that a patent holder who made 
a FRAND commitment simply failed to abide by that FRAND commitment. 
A lot has been written about FRAND commitments, but they are in some sense 
incomplete contract terms. When an SSO requires a FRAND commitment, and a patent 
holder contributes his IP and says, “I’ll negotiate on a FRAND basis,” that is a placeholder 
for something to be determined through future negotiation.  
When those negotiations break down, for whatever reason, that may give rise to a 
contract claim for breach of a FRAND commitment and courts could sort out what the 
value of the rights are. The courts do that all the time. The contract claim, however, doesn’t 
convert automatically into an antitrust claim just because that FRAND commitment was 
made in the context of a standard-setting organization. 
We have taken that position and we are very committed to it. We believe that the 
threat of treble damages undermines the incentive to innovate and the incentive to invest 
that Judge Michel was talking about. The virtuous cycle — which begins with investment, 
then innovation, implementation — and then the cycle of dynamic competition is slowed 
if the incentive to innovate is not well protected. 
 
30 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at University 
of Pennsylvania. Law School: The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018). 
31 15 U.S.C §§ 1-38. 
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We are concerned that the inaccurate application of the antitrust law in this context 
threatens to do exactly that and undermines the incentive to innovate. 
That doesn’t mean antitrust law has no role with regard to standard-setting 
organizations. We’ve been very clear that we do believe, as Nick referred to, a standard-
setting organization is a group of competitors coming together to exclude. The rules that 
we are focused on are the rules of the Supreme Court, which has taken a bit of a beating 
today, articulated in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.32 and American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.33 about standard-setting 
organizations: they are rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity; they need to be 
safeguarded to make sure that the decision-making is balanced and that the right technology 
for the beneficial purpose of the organization is adopted. 
So we are more focused now in terms of antitrust enforcement on how standard-
setting organizations operate. How do they select a particular technology?   How do they 
adopt patent policies that guide the operation of the SDO? Is the representation fair and 
balanced? Are there groups of members within an SDO that are trying to exclude 
competing technology? Are there groups of implementers that are trying to suppress the 
rates paid to certain technology holders? Those are things that are concerning us. 
We have written some letters to the American National Standards Institute and we 
have done some other competition advocacy along those lines. We’re interested in those 
issues. 
The second part of our agenda is focusing on the joint conduct of members of 
standard-setting organizations, to try to preserve the promise of standard-setting 
organizations to choose the best innovations and create the best standards, and to preserve 
the cycle of innovation. 
Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: Right on time. Well done. 
Any questions? 
QUESTION [Thomas Cotter, University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis]: 
If an SDO, let’s say, were to adopt a policy requiring disputes over FRAND terms to be 
submitted to some duly established new tribunal, would that be a problem from the 
perspective of the Antitrust Division? 
Relatedly, some SDOs have subgroups, special-interest groups — they may go by 
different names — whereby certain groups of members may work on certain policies, may 
be trying to address certain specific problems. Do firms now run the risk of antitrust 
liability if they participate in such subgroups? 
MR. FINCH: Two questions. The first one is an interesting idea; that is, should 
FRAND disputes automatically be subject to some sort of arbitration. 
One thing that we’ve been very clear about is that we encourage standard-setting 
organizations in thinking about their IP policies to be flexible, to innovate in that regard, 
and to in some sense compete with each other. So it could be possible that your idea might 
work. It might be interesting. It could be something worth trying. 
I’m not in the business of giving business review letters when I’m sitting on panels, 
but that’s something that might be worthy of consideration. It could help resolve the issue, 
depending of course on how it’s implemented and who wants to implement it and what the 
actual mechanisms are. 
 
32 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
33 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
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On your second question about special-interest groups, again it depends on the 
facts. There are issues around special-interest groups that could actually raise concerns. 
Who are the members? Is it known that the special-interest group exists? How much power 
or how many votes does the special-interest group have compared to the members of the 
actual organization itself? There are all kinds of questions swirling around there. 
Sometimes it’s possible to run the risk of antitrust liability, yes. There is antitrust 
risk everywhere in this endeavor, but can you minimize it by thinking about how to operate 
a special-interest group in a way that maximizes transparency and avoids dominance and 
things like that? 
Again, it depends on the facts. There is risk, but there is also, I think, a way to 
manage it. 
QUESTION [Claudia Tapia, Ericsson]: One question because we were talking 
before about the principles of open, transparent, consensus based — all these principles 
that help to have certain safeguards — do you see them in order to avoid antitrust concerns 
to be those principles only applied to the standardization process or also to the development 
and approval of IPR policies? 
MR. FINCH: Certainly, at the level of the approval of IPR policies. Of course, our 
first focus was the process of selecting a technology to embody in the standard, but you 
can also achieve an anticompetitive result if you manage to change the IPR policy through 
a skewed process. There’s sometimes an idea that somehow the next level up, which is the 
process for adopting the policy or the management of the SDO itself, is somehow immune 
from antitrust concern.  That is not something that we would agree with. That’s an area 
where there should be focus and attention to the antitrust risks. 
QUESTION [David Sutcliffe, Sports Technology]: A follow-up question, Andrew. 
On the cover of today’s New York Times34 an article about a proposed $5 billion fine — it 
might be less — for Facebook mentioned that a $5 billion fine to a company that’s got $56 
billion in annual revenue is essentially a slap on the wrist.  
Jerry Nadler told a group of us about ten days ago here at Fordham that he in 
particular was going to look into the monopoly situation of companies like Amazon, 
Google, and Facebook. 
Isn’t it time — obviously, Elizabeth Warren thinks it’s past time — that the 
government and your Department look into breaking up these companies, which are 
monopoly companies dominating the world with their platforms? I wonder what your 
thoughts are.  
MR. FINCH: I only have seven seconds left. [Laughter] 
I really can’t comment on the FTC’s investigation of Facebook. I would refer you 
to some speeches I’ve given previously on the issue of monopolization. There is a Capitol 
Forum speech in December that you could look at. 
PROF. HANSEN: Okay. Thank you very much. 
Marco, you’re a pretty big cheese in the European Commission. How does it feel 
to be running this? You had a lot to do with the copyright reforms that just came out, didn’t 
you? 
MR. GIORELLO: Yes. I feel relief and very happy. 
PROF. HANSEN: A lot of people thought it couldn’t happen, so congratulations 
on just getting it done. 
 
34 Mike Isaac & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Expected to be Fined Up to $5 Billion by F.T.C. 
Over Privacy Issues, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr.      25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/facebook-ftc-fine-privacy.html. 
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MR. GIORELLO: Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: DGs change. There used to be DG I, DG II, DG III; then they 
sort of morphed to DG Internal Market; now there’s Growth, there’s CONNECT. What are 
we supposed to figure out from DG CONNECT, other than it normally was considered 
pro-tech? Is it still? 
MR. GIORELLO: I think it was intentional to move copyright to DG CONNECT 
five years ago to deliver the copyright reform. This is a little bit our internal dynamics, but 
for many years there were different views within the Commission on how to approach the 
subject. Then, at some point, the political willingness to deliver copyright reform came to 
the fore, and I think it was a wise decision actually to merge the two departments dealing 
with copyright. After that, I think it worked much better. I think the result is we've achieved 
copyright reform partly because of this. 
PROF. HANSEN: Please proceed. 
MR. GIORELLO: Thanks a lot for the invitation. In my few minutes I will try to 
start drawing some first lessons learned from this big story actually, which was the 
negotiation of the copyright reform. Formally the Directive35 was adopted only ten days 
ago. It is a long story, but the final signature was only ten days ago. 
As many of you know, this was a very long and controversial political process. It 
was highly political. There was a constant need to find the majorities among the Member 
States and within the European Parliament. There was a lot of public debate. This makes 
the story interesting because it allows us now to draw some conclusions about the state of 
copyright in the digital economy and about the policymakers’ thinking about copyright 
nowadays. Of course, this is a discussion which will probably last for many years to come. 
As you know, the original Commission proposal, which was pretty much endorsed 
in the end in the final Copyright Directive, covered a broad range of provisions, many 
players affected, many different aspects. This again, I think, is what makes it very 
interesting to see what happened because you can see how the different players have been 
considered in the end in the final Directive. I will focus on just a few examples. 
The first category of interesting conclusions is what the Directive, as finally 
adopted, tells us in terms of the role of rightsholders, of copyright industries, in the 
copyright framework in Europe. The message here is that in the end the challenges that the 
rightsholders are facing in the digital economy in their relationship with the platforms have 
been recognized. One can definitely see that in the end the policymakers sided with the 
copyright industries on that. But to some extent this also comes with a price in terms of 
checks and balances for rightsholders. Let me just give you two examples. 
As you know, the new Directive introduces a new copyright for press publishers, 
a neighboring right, which is something that did not exist before in European law. While 
previous neighboring rights, like for film producers, had been drafted in one paragraph in 
previous legislation, now the new publishers’ right is an article with ten paragraphs. This 
tells us how complex lawmaking in this area has become. 
Second example: the liability of the platforms has been recognized in Article 17,36 
but it comes with checks and balances in terms of mitigation of liability and new provisions 
to protect the users uploading the content in certain situations.  
 
35 Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. 
36 Id. at 119-21. 
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If one looks at the final Directive from the perspective of the users, there are a 
number of provisions on exceptions aiming at stimulating public policy objectives in the 
areas of education, research, text and data mining. 
I think it is also interesting to see that while there are new exceptions, they often 
come with novelties in terms of mechanisms which to some extent are there to leave a 
space, in some cases giving priority to licenses even in cases where exceptions apply. Three 
examples. 
• The new teaching exception gives Member States the possibility to give priority 
to licenses when implementing the exception in national law. 
• The new general text and data mining exception comes with the right for 
rightsholders to opt-out from it if they want to license their content in certain situations. 
• The new mechanism for simplified licenses to facilitate the digitization of cultural 
heritage is complemented by a so called “fallback exception” which applies to allow 
digitation and online display of out-of-commerce works if licensing solutions are not 
available.  
These are all interesting novelties which talk about an attempt to find a balance 
and to find a middle way between exclusive rights, public policy objectives, and exceptions 
in a number of areas. 
Some people may think that this is too complex, that this is not good. I actually 
have a different opinion. I think that this level of complexity was necessary. Rather than 
complexity, I would say it is pragmatism; it is the attempt to find good solutions, to find 
the balance in the copyright system. 
To conclude, what does this story tell us about copyright more generally? As we 
know, this was a negotiation that in the end was depicted very much as a battle between 
the Internet platforms and the content industries. To some extent it was. It was very 
political. We also had our days of Wikipedia closing down, people demonstrating in the 
streets, and all those things. But in the end, the fact that we managed to deliver this reform 
shows that we can still deliver complex reforms in the Internet. In the end, copyright still 
matters in the digital economy and its role has been recognized by the European 
policymakers. 
Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you very much for that excellent presentation. 
